The Syrian Social Nationalist Party Read online

  The presiding judge then asked Saadeh if he understood French, and on hearing the affirmative proceeded to detail the case against the defendants based on the documents and reports in his file. In summary, the judge contended that the SSNP was working clandestinely for a revolutionary purpose aiming to change the form of government, endangering the safety of the country, preventing members of the state from exercising their civil rights, and fomenting hatred of the French. The revolution was being prepared in earnest as documented by the robust organization of the party and the maps of military installations found in the possession of party members, but that the SSNP lacked the finances to fulfill its purpose, hence the front commercial enterprise that had been recently started for that purpose. The judge then examined the hierarchical structure of the SSNP, commenting that the meticulous order and design of the organization suggest influence of recent similar efforts in Europe. The judge then invited Saadeh to respond instructing the defendants to limit their comments to the legal aspects of the proceedings and not to turn his court into a political circus.

  Saadeh was then asked if he would speak in French. Saadeh answered that he wished to speak in Arabic. The judge entreated him to speak in French since he was fluent in the language. Saadeh retorted that in view of the seriousness of the charges and that he was being asked to improvise a verbal response, he needed not to be encumbered by having to speak a foreign tongue. When the judge insisted, Saadeh responded: “Your honor, I am a Syrian and in Syria, and I lead a liberation movement that aims to make national sovereignty absolute, so I will not accept to be made to speak in my country a language that is not my own!” It was then agreed that Saadeh would address the court in Arabic and that the court secretary would translate sentence-by-sentence Saadeh’s response.

  Saadeh then proceeded systematically to address the charges laid against him and his Party. To the first charge of organizing a clandestine political organization, Saadeh admitted his responsibility for the founding of the SSNP. As to the clandestine character of the organization, he declared that it was a temporary measure with no nefarious intent. Next, Saadeh addressed the issue of endangering the integrity of the state. The state in question was the newly formed state of Lebanon. Saadeh, by calling for a broader Syrian unity was “endangering” the integrity of this invented state. His response to the charge was uncompromising:

  “I am accused of endangering the integrity of the state and desecration of the homeland. I find myself compelled to declare based on reason and not emotion that the integrity of the unity of our country and the desecration of the homeland have been achieved in fact in San Remo, Sèvres, and Lausanne, and that the parties responsible for that are not the SSNP.”

  The prosecution objected that the accused had bypassed the issue of defense to address political issues unrelated to the case and hence irrelevant and unsuited to this forum. The presiding judge sustained the objection of the prosecution and admonished Saadeh to desist from this political track, to which the latter responded:

  “Your honor, and honorable prosecutor general, our case is a political case. We are not here because we are thieves or bandits, but because we are a political social movement! These charges leveled against us are they not political charges so how can I not tackle political issues when I respond to political charges. Furthermore, what I have stated are historical facts for in San Remo our country was divided and our homeland splintered, and in Sèvres and Lausanne were concocted the remaining blows against our social, economic and political unity. Clarifying these facts is my right and my duty not only in defense of myself but also in defense of the integrity of my homeland and the rights of my nation!”

  This served only to further infuriate the prosecution and annoy the presiding judge. After several interventions from his own attorneys, Saadeh agreed to continue saying that he said as much as he needed to say about those issues.

  Saadeh then addressed the charge of changing the form of government. He stated that changing the form of government might be necessary for the better interests of the country as the needs of societies change with time. In any case, since the SSNP had not reached a definitive conclusion on this issue, it cannot be faulted for considering the matter. As to the issue of mimicking foreign political organization, Saadeh referred the judge to his speech of June 1, 1935 and other documents that clearly state the independence of SSNP thinking, free of any foreign influence and resistance to foreign propaganda.

  As to the abrogation of the civil rights of citizenry, Saadeh explained that the conditions under which the SSNP was founded necessitated the organizational form adopted. Here he and the judge were both making reference to the strict hierarchical discipline that the SSNP adopted.

  “A nation … in which there is no freedom of expression of political ideas and national doctrines, a nation that has no public forum and where the organization of political parties is forbidden, is a nation living no doubt in unusual circumstances. Unusual circumstances require unusual policies. I founded the SSNP to empower my fellow citizens to exercise their abrogated civil and political rights freely and not to prevent them from exercising these rights.” At this critical juncture, Saadeh digressed to define from his perspective the role of the Mandate. “Our right to sovereignty is recognized officially by international treaties. It is also recognized by the Mandate. Our condition under the Mandate puts a heavy responsibility on our shoulders that I wish to highlight specifically and that is: The Mandate was installed to provide administrative advice and guidance and what that implies is that all other prerogatives are the safeguarded rights of the people under the Mandate whose independence has been recognized. For if the Mandate is to help us, our duty towards the Mandate is to foster the maturity of our national rights and national strength in ways that preserve our unique character. By founding the SSNP, we are shouldering this duty and hence aiding the Mandate power with its mission.”

  Sentences were delivered on January 28, 1936. Saadeh was sentenced to six months imprisonment and a fine of 25 Syrian pounds. Thabit, Qubersi, Naqash, and Ayubi were each sentenced to one month with suspended sentence and a fine of 25 Syrian pounds. Fifteen other party members received a two weeks suspended sentence.

  The terms of imprisonment represented the obligatory minimum under the prevailing laws and reflected the leniency of the court. It is important to consider here the reasons for the leniency. The social standing of the SSNP members under trial (they represented for the most part the local intelligentsia) and the more serious threats faced by the Mandate are the likely reasons behind the clemency.

  During this period of imprisonment, momentous events were taking place in the country in particular the question of the two treaties: the Franco-Lebanese and the Franco-Syrian. On instructions from Saadeh, two leading members of the SSNP met in Damascus with the Syrian Delegation heading to Paris for the continuation of negotiations and delivered a memorandum addressing economic aspects of the treaties. Subsequently, another memorandum addressing Syrian unity and the status of Lebanon was delivered to the delegation before its departure on March 22.19

  Politicians interested in Syrian union, such as Lebanese Sunni political leaders hoping to benefit from the support of Christian representatives, initially embraced the SSNP tentatively. Leading members of the SSNP were invited to participate in the meeting of Mu’tamar al-Sahel (Congress of the Coast) held in the house of the noted Sunni politician Salim Ali Salam on March 10, 1936. While the Sunni politicians wanted the predominantly Sunni regions of the Grand Liban, (the coastal areas) detached and unified with Syria, the SSNP was calling for full unification of the Grand Liban and the hinterland.

  VISIBILITY AND WIDESPREAD INVOLVEMENT (1936-1938)

  The Mandate authorities had tracked and monitored the growth and progress of the nascent clandestine organization and chose to intervene when the SSNP was reaching a critical mass that could rapidly acquire a political role. It chose to be lenient in its sentencing of its leaders likely underestimating
their resolve to continue on their charted path. The Mandate attempted to limit the impact and national role of the SSNP through the subservient local governments that exercised various forms of intimidation, persecution and threats. When these failed, a negotiated temporary political truce would be attempted.

  As soon as the initial trial and prison sentences were dispensed with, Saadeh led the Party on a course of intense public involvement in national and social affairs unprecedented in the modern history of Syria. The SSNP and its leader addressed themselves to every aspect of Syrian life: the Zionist settlements in the south (Palestine); the Turkish expansionism in the north (the district of Alexandretta); the economic morass; the persecution of intellectuals (the feminist pioneer May Ziadeh); the incursion of clergy into the political scene; the reactionary parties in the mock national assemblies formed by the Mandate authorities; the rights of workers; the formation of trade unions; deforestation; the artistic directions of poets, painters and writers; the organization of SSNP branches in all the major cities of Syria; and the growth of the intellectual heritage of the Party by the writings of the leader and his young associates.

  The Party brought a vibrancy to the national scene and an intellectual impact that were unexpected for its numerical size. The main reasons for this phenomenon are the charismatic leadership of Saadeh and his ability to elicit impassioned commitment and response from his followers. This phase of the history of the SSNP was punctuated by the Mandate authorities repeatedly attempting to repress the growth of the Party by resorting alternatively to repetitive imprisonment of Saadeh, to encouragement of reactionary confessional parties to compete with the SSNP, to suppression of the freedom of the press and attempts at political assassination.

  The impact of the SSNP is best illustrated by the flurry of attempts to limit its spread and curb its activities. The clergy and traditional politicians marshalled their press and pamphleteers to undermine the appeal of the Party in particular target groups. The Christian clergy attacked the Party as being anti-religious and anti-Lebanon. The French hastened to encourage the founding of political parties with distinct confessional appeal to compete with the SSNP. Members of the old regime felt understandably threatened by the new movement and the pressure on the Party mounted. The battle was ideological and political. On the former front, the Party felt secure. Its teachings had been expounded in Saadeh’s writings in pamphlets and the Party’s daily newspaper an-Nahda (Renaissance), and bolstered by the publication of Saadeh’s pivotal book The Emergence of Nations in which he laid the scientific foundations of Syrian Nationalism. On the political front, the Party’s resources were meager. Funds were limited and the growing political base was still not large enough to challenge the old order and the Mandate. If the national liberation movement was to definitively confront the Mandate, it needed international support. On this basis, Saadeh embarked on a trip to Europe and the Americas to garner support from Syrian immigrants.

  FREEDOM INTERLUDE

  Paradoxically, the imprisonment of Saadeh and his lieutenants in November of 1935 gave the SSNP a public platform and national visibility it would have been pressed to achieve had they remained a clandestine group. Gaining visibility is ephemeral. To play a decisive role on the political scene, Saadeh and the SSNP needed to show credible strength. True, leaders of the SSNP had been invited to the Congress of the Littoral, participated in localized public demonstrations, and agitated in the press, but a more definitive show of strength was needed.

  Saadeh was released from prison on May 12, 1936.20 His lieutenants and a troupe of SSNP members met him. That evening several private celebrations took place and on subsequent days a protracted schedule of small meetings unfolded. Saadeh was dissatisfied with this plan and had requested a large gathering as a show of force.21 Fearful of the repercussions of such a gathering, the leadership of the SSNP convinced Saadeh to substitute a drawn out schedule of regional receptions. Saadeh acceded to their request although he chafed at the lost opportunity.22

  Having dispensed with the long schedule of receptions and meetings with regional groups, Saadeh resumed his administrative leadership of the SSNP by relieving Labaki from his position as deputy leader and directed his attention to the momentous political issues at hand. One pressing activity presented itself: taking a public stand on the issues of the Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese treaties under consideration.

  THE FRANCO-SYRIAN TREATIES

  In the mid-1930’s, the French Mandate was faced with turbulence and resistance from several fronts. Political activists that had reached prominence through feudal standings, economic prominence in the cities, or clergy support were clamoring for more political influence and a form of local autonomy. In Iraq, the British Mandate had been transformed by the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930 into an Alliance between the British government and the government of Iraq. To assuage political activists in Damascus and Beirut, the French government of Leon Blum’s Popular Front entered in 1936 into negotiations with the local governments that led to the drafting of two treaties modeled on the Anglo-Iraqi agreement and aimed, in principle, at providing local autonomy while maintaining important ties between France and the two Syrian states.

  The treaties were eagerly ratified in both Beirut and Damascus parliaments but received no such expedient acceptance in the French parliament. When the government of Blum lost power, the colonialist officers and the French right assured the demise of those treaties. The SSNP opposed the treaties on the premise that they did not establish unequivocal national sovereignty. It viewed the treaties as ploys by the Mandate to maintain a grip on Syrian affairs. Furthermore, the treaties were imposing a forcible mandate with no legal basis, and which was not sanctioned by the Syrians, into an arrangement that did not differ substantially from its precedent, but was endowed with legality having been accepted by the “indigenous population”. Whereas Syrian politicians were seeking temporary political gains, the SSNP’s strategy was guided by the overriding importance of national rights and absolute sovereignty.

  On June15, 1936, Saadeh published what became known as the Blue Memorandum (al-Balagh al-Azraq). The Blue memorandum stands out as one of the most important political policy statements that Saadeh was to make during this period. For years to come, he would hark back to this document and invoke it as a metric of the veracity of his analysis of the confrontation with the French Mandate and for the failures of the traditional political forces in Syria.

  Negotiations were being conducted in Paris and while the SSNP had submitted memoranda to the Syrian delegates, Saadeh felt that the developments in these negotiations were not progressing in a manner favorable to Syrian interests. In the Blue Memorandum, Saadeh aimed to expose the nefarious nature of the French position and to call attention to the danger lurking behind the diplomacy:

  “The Mandate has been very successful in Lebanon itself with the election of the extremely separatist Lebanese government by a parliament that is anything but representative of the political and economic interests of the people.

  The Lebanese question is an integral part of the Syrian cause and should not be considered separately… All Syrian questions, including the question of Lebanon, should be unified in one general program and one cause. It is reasonable for the cause to advance in stages as long as it retains its unitary character and as long as it is not chained in treaties for unacceptably long periods. … Opposing unity and insisting on the politics of separatism is a harebrained policy that perpetuates our dire conditions and does nothing to improve our national status either politically or economically.

  The Syrian Nationalists, whose party branch in Lebanon was dissolved by the government, are the primary organized force in Syria and I declare in their name that any treaty that does not contain clauses to preserve Syrian national unity will be met by their refusal…

  If the edict of the President of the Lebanese Republic has dissolved the branch of the SSNP in Beirut, it did not dissolve the Syrian Nationalists themselves. They con
tinue their work in Lebanon as in all other regions as members of the Lebanese state entitled to express their opinion in all matters pertaining to their destiny and interests…” 23

  Saadeh opposed the ideas of those treaties on the premise that they did not establish unequivocal national sovereignty. He viewed these treaties as ploys by the Mandate to maintain a grip on Syrian affairs. Furthermore, these treaties were transforming an enforced mandate with no legal basis and which was not sanctioned by the Syrians into an arrangement that did not differ substantially from its precedent, but was endowed with ‘legality’ having been accepted by the ‘indigenous’ population. Whereas Syrian politicians were seeking temporary political gains, Saadeh’s strategy was guided by the primordial importance of national rights and absolute sovereignty. Saadeh’s concerns were fully vindicated by the professed views of the French negotiators.24

  These treaties would have enshrined and codified the separation of Lebanon from the rest of Syria and carried the potential for further dismemberment of the hinterland. Since these treaties would come under the purview of the League of Nations, then the separation would receive legal international status or be condoned by international regulations, a further bolstering of the separatist agenda.

  THE SECOND ARREST

  Politically clumsy actions by party members sent Saadeh and several comrades back to prison. The event was almost banal, but it provided both the Lebanese and French authorities the pretext to get the SSNP and its leader out of the way. The Lebanese government under the leadership of the devout francophone president Emile Eddeh wanted the status of Lebanon codified by a separate treaty, and a vocal agent for Syrian unity was not to his liking.