The Syrian Social Nationalist Party Read online

  Saadeh was arrested within forty days after his release from his first imprisonment. The proximal reason was the assault on the journalist Aref al-Ghorayeb by members of the SSNP.25 The more important reasons, however, stemmed from the efforts of the Lebanese government of Emile Eddeh to assert its control over the Lebanese political landscape and ensure harmony with the policy of the Mandate. Hence, the official charge was the reconstitution of an illegal political party that had been dissolved by presidential decree the previous March 1936.

  During the course of the investigation into the assault on ‘Aref al-Gharib, the authorities discovered a copy of an emergency decree dated June 20, 1936 that directed party members to initiate acts of civil disobedience in all the regions of the French Mandate if the government were to resume persecution of the SSNP. This find was the casus belli for the issuance of an arrest warrant.26

  The Lebanese authorities leveled against Saadeh the charges of sedition, illegal organization of a political party, and acting as agents of foreign government. The accusation of a relationship with Italy was leaked to the press, which led the Italian ambassador in Beirut, like his German colleague before him, to visit the High Commissioner’s office and lodge a complaint about these allegations. This intervention resulted in further consultations between the High Commissioner’s office, the office of the Presidency of the Lebanese republic, and the Attorney General’s office which resulted in the latter denying the truth of these allegations.27

  Saadeh’s incarceration was prolonged beyond the requirements of a thorough investigation of an assault incident, and in spite of the total lack of evidence of any relationship with foreign powers. It seemed that a deliberate prolongation of his confinement was being executed, ostensibly to keep him away from the political scene while the two treaties were being negotiated and president Eddeh was able to put the Lebanese house in order by engineering a reconciliation between the Maronite Patriarch and the French Mandate. Every bureaucratic maneuver to delay the release was utilized.28

  MEMORANDUM TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

  On August 12, 1936 while Saadeh was still in prison, the SSNP represented by Nehmeh Thabit submitted a detailed memorandum to the League of Nations on the subject of the separation of the Lebanese state from the Syrian hinterland.29

  The memorandum fits in with the escalation of the SSNP’s opposition to the terms being discussed for the Franco-Syrian treaty and the preliminary deliberations of the Franco-Lebanese treaty. We see a continuous thread from the documents presented to the Syrian delegation in March, to the Blue Memorandum in June, to the Memorandum to the League in August, to articles in the local press. A crucial aspect of the memorandum was its presentation of a political formula for the resolution of the conflict between the outcomes of the Treaties (codified separation of Lebanon from the hinterland) and the unification of Geographic Syria. The compromise formula was federalism of the Syrian States.

  In the memorandum, Thabit acknowledges that the best political system for Syria is a unitary state. However, because of clear obstacles a federal system has merits as a transitional state. Thabit contends:

  “Partitioning the country into separate states has nefarious consequences not only in the economic sphere, but also impacts negatively on national and political development… If we assume for the sake of argument that Syria was not at the end of the World War ready to be under one government, there is no reason why a single government was not possible under the Mandate. The creation of independent states in Syria, each tied to the interests of the clergy and feudal lords affects negatively the progress of the country towards manifesting a single nationhood… We assert that Syrian nationhood is an undisputable fact based on the examination of geographic, economic, social, cultural and historic ties. The creation of more than one sovereign state in geographic Syria on the pretext of some social or political ills is not only irrational but also contrary to the national interests of the Syrians. There is a need to establish a system that addresses the social and political challenges that the nation suffers while at the same time allowing the natural progress towards a complete unitary national state. Thus, in view of the erratic conditions created by the Mandate, we propose the establishment of a federal Syrian government covering all the Syrian lands under the French Mandate (emphasis added)… A unitary central government is the natural consequence of nationhood. Unfortunately, the Mandate has not fostered such a development. We therefore submit that a federal system is the best system that allows for the actualization of Syrian nationhood without undue turmoil in some segments of the population that may fear this development under a unitary state (emphasis added)… The federal system that we propose while limiting administrative powers over the subunits of the federation, promotes the development of a central jurisdiction over matters of broad national interest (e.g. military). This system will allow the desires and needs of subunits to be acknowledged at the local level.”

  This proposal was aimed at avoiding the emergence of distinct, different and insular communities in Syria (as happened subsequently). It also allowed for the development of a central government strong enough to unify the constituent states in their pursuit of common goals. Coupled with the work of the SSNP at the grass root level, the federalist state 30 would evolve into a unitary state. This proposal engineered a solution to the political problem at hand by accommodating temporarily the political cleavages brought about by confessionals divisions.

  STRENGTHENING THE IDEOLOGICAL BASE

  Up to this date, the SSNP did not have a core document expounding its ideology and aim. While the Basic and Reform principles were defined, their implications and meanings required further elaboration. So Saadeh undertook during his imprisonment to prepare an ideological treatise to address this need. This text was to evolve through three editions with various additions and elaborations until its last form in the 1947 fourth edition. The first edition of this exposition of the SSNP ideology was printed in a small booklet of 45 pages.

  The text detailed the tenets of the SSNP and addressed topical issues the SSNP was facing at the time such as the opposition by the National Bloc,31 and the question of the invented national identities of Pan-Arabism (and the accusation of being anti-Arab)32 and Lebanese separatism (and the accusation of being an enemy of the various states in Syria).33

  The other task that Saadeh undertook while in prison was the development of the structure of the SSNP by the formation of local committees and regional councils, in effect introducing a form of progressive democracy within the centralized structure of the Party. This task completed the architecture of the political organization. It imbued the organization with democratic traditions that foster involvement.

  This organizational refinement consisted of the institution of a system of regional elected councils progressing from the smallest unit (al-Mudiriyah, town or neighborhood unit) to the full party level. The council of the Mudiriyah is a consultative body whose membership needs to be approved by a majority vote. It sends a representative to the Munaffaziyah (district level branch) council, which has both advisory and supervisory functions. This district level council reviews and approves the budget of the district and supervises all regional plans not initiated under a central directive. This council can recommend by two-thirds majority the dismissal of the district executives. The district council elects one of its members to a general congress of the party. The latter is called into session once a year by the leadership. The general congress reviews the party budget, proposes projects or administrative changes and makes general recommendations on party affairs. This congress elects a president and secretary who remain in contact with the executive leadership when the congress is not in session. Membership in this general congress is restricted to one term.

  TACTICAL PRICE FOR FREEDOM

  Just as his arrest was political, Saadeh’s release from prison had to be under a political formula agreeable to the Lebanese government (accepting of the legitimacy of the existing Republic). In a do
cument Saadeh addressed to the members of the SSNP upon his release, he wanted to clarify how operating within the framework of existing “proto-sates” does not contravene the national unity doctrine.

  “Our political stand as pertains current events and political conditions remains as stated in our public statement released on June 15, 1936 [the Blue Memorandum] … The plan we have followed towards our final goal and from which we will not deviate does not ignore facts on the ground when addressing political issues… The facts are that Syria is divided into internationally recognized regions, which create a serious problem in national and international rights that requires political and organizational flexibility to solve…

  The requirements of public political activity for the branches of the Syrian National movement in Lebanon, al-Sham, Palestine and Jordan… force us to consider the particular political programs that need to be developed for each branch of the movement to ensure that all branches work for the same great aim without endangering the safety of the movement.

  The safety of the National movement and satisfying the requirements of public political action in Lebanon make it imperative that we formulate a program for the work of the Syrian National movement branch in this region. For this purpose, we will convene a meeting of party leaders in Lebanon to evaluate the conditions and define a plan of action… After completing our plan for Lebanon, we will prepare a program for al-Sham, Palestine and Jordan. We are confident that this approach will create broad opportunities for national action and allow the branches of the Syrian National movement venues of serving the common national cause without ignoring local conditions…

  The plan of developing a specific program for every branch of the Syrian National movement will facilitate our work within the confines of the present conditions and prevent the misunderstanding of the movement’s cause…

  The enemies of the National movement will spare no effort to misinterpret every technical political plan of our movement. We declare that our principles are unchanged and that all political programs for the branches will be based on and consistent with our original principles…” 34

  Ideologically, the SSNP had to face the question: Is a one state necessary for a one nation? While historical processes allowed for the emergence of nations despite the absence of a single unified polity, contemporary nations were in need of political unity in their struggle for emancipation and survival. Nations and states had emerged independently, but is a unified national state required to safeguard the interests of the nation? The promise of the promulgation of state-specific political action programs may reflect adaptability to the facts on the ground. On face value, this is a setback to unification nationalism that strives to render the cultural boundaries of the nation (its social form) and its governance boundaries (its state) congruent. While the SSNP’s program did include a re-organization of the political space, it was not restricted to this goal. It aimed at a comprehensive transformation of the social-cultural-political framework of Syria transcending, but not ignoring, unification nationalism.

  DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH THE MANDATE

  Establishing a dialogue with the Mandate authorities was an obvious task of any political movement. Upon his release from prison in November of 1936, Saadeh asked his lieutenant Abdallah Qubersi to contact the head of the Political Department at the High Commissioner’s office and arrange a meeting.35 At this meeting were present the head of the Political Department Baron Kieffer, Saadeh, and Qubersi. Baron Kieffer was a prominent and influential member of the administration of Comte de Martel, the French High Commissioner. He had been involved in the negotiations with local leaders pursuant to the disturbances in the hinterland earlier in the year.36 He was also along with Count de Martel and Robert du Caix a member of the French team in the negotiations of the Franco-Syrian treaty.37 Saadeh and Kieffer delved into various political and historical topics, an opportunity for Saadeh to articulate the merits of the national movement and the potential for mutual understanding that would serve the interests of both Syria and France. The French diplomat was cordial, but this cordiality had undertones of subversion.

  THE TREATIES: RIOTS AND CHALLENGES

  The Franco-Lebanese treaty orchestrated by President Emile Eddeh was a major setback to unification efforts and must have thwarted the Muslim communities who were demanding the reversal of the annexation of the Muslim districts to Lebanon and their restitution to the Syrian state. For Lebanese separatists, the treaty consecrated the frontiers of the Grand Liban of 1920.38

  Saadeh’s release from his second imprisonment coincided with the confessional riots of November 1936 in the wake of the conclusion of the Franco-Lebanese treaty negotiations.

  On Sunday, November 15, 1936, the Hizb al-Wihdah al-Lubnaniah (Lebanese Union Party) 39 led demonstrations in Beirut in celebration of the signing of the treaty 2 days before.40 Lebanese Union Party members in their official uniform (White Shirts) marched towards the offices of the Government at the Petit Serail on Martyrs’ Square. President Eddeh and his government made an appearance on the balcony of his office and he was greeted with applause. This was expected to be the end of the event. Instead, the demonstrators marched through the Muslim areas of the city as an act of defiance against those opposing the treaty. The Muslims responded to this provocation by gathering around the area of the Basta Mosque where fiery speeches by Muslim politicians fueled their anger and sent them on acts of rampage. Christian crowds responded in kind, petty criminals and fanatics on both sides damaged property in the capital, and rioting was unchecked. The French army was called in to contain the riots and disperse the demonstrators. The repercussions incited angry partisans of both sides to plan further activities.

  In response to the riots, the SSNP marshaled forces to stem the tide of hatred and violent clashes. Organized teams of SSNP members worked in various parts of the capital and the outlying areas to forestall escalation. Saadeh, Labaki 41 and others wrote editorials strongly censoring all parties to the riots.42

  The above events hastened the emergence of various sectarian political parties, notably an-Najjadah (the Rescuers) on the Muslim side and al-Kataeb (the Phalanges) on the Maronite Christian side, both of which date their founding to November 1936.

  THE QUESTION OF ALEXANDRETTA

  Another crisis that faced Syria during this period was the question of the district of Alexandretta. Emboldened by French weakness, the Turkish Republic was claiming rights to the Syrian district of Alexandretta. The government of Damascus, eager to have the treaty with France ratified without delay, and to avoid any conflicts with the Mandate and to insure political gain and ascendency, faltered on the protection of national right and failed to mount any effective resistance to the advancing Turks. Saadeh publicly denounced the government of Damascus defeatist attitude, the complicity of the Mandate, and the approbations by the Egyptian government. Having no military force and no access to arms, he proposed to enroll the entire membership of the SSNP in a national army that would defend the northern borders. He appealed to the League of Nations, to the French government, and to the various Syrian governments to prevent the Turkish overtaking of Syrian land. His warnings and calls for action were unheeded and the District of Alexandretta was annexed by Turkey in 1939. To this day, the Party holds commemorations of the Day of the Northern Borders and refuses to forsake that piece of Syrian homeland.

  Saadeh's analysis of the unfolding question of Alexandretta correctly identified the expansionist intentions of Turkey and the clever maneuvers of the Turkish government playing on the fears of the French of a Turkish-Italian rapprochement, while at the same time creating divisions by infiltrating the province and inciting riots. He also correctly reads the fledgling resistance of the French in the face of Turkish sabre-rattling. Most importantly, however, he recognizes how the ethnic religious Arab nationalism of the National Bloc was alienating the non-Sunni inhabitants of the province and undermining any viable resistance to Turkish maneuvers.

  Since the Franco-
Turkish agreement of 1921, the Sanjaq 43 of Alexandretta had not received any serious attention from the Turkish government. News of the Franco-Syrian treaty, however, rekindled the interest of the Turkish government .44 The official reason declared was to avoid having a Turkish population being placed under Arab domination.45 On October 9, the Turkish government officially requested the French government to elevate the Sanjaq into an independent state, linked to France by a treaty similar to the Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese on the premise of protecting the rights of the Turkish inhabitants of the Sanjaq.

  On November 23, The French government offered Turkey a choice: If Turkey did not raise the issue of political allegiance of the Sanjaq to Syria, France would take steps to provide guarantees favorable to the Turkish element in the Sanjaq. If the Turkish government insisted on the independence of the Sanjaq from Syria, then the French would refer the case to the League. Turkey chose the second alternative.

  Saadeh entered the fray on December 14, 1936. In a memorandum to the League of Nations, he declared that the SSNP would consider “any act aimed at separating Alexandretta from Syria or limiting Syrian sovereignty over the sanjak as an infringement on the sovereignty of the Syrian nation and a violation of Article 22 of the Charter of the League of Nations.” 46

  In the first week of January 1937, Atatürk rushed with Turkish troops to the Syrian frontier and his supporters staged a riot in Antioch.47 In response, Saadeh addressed a memorandum to the French High Commissioner putting the human resources of the SSNP in the service of any plan to protect the district. Saadeh was reminding the French of their duty under the terms of the Mandate to defend the Syrian territory under their care. He was also setting the example for the Syrian governments to voice a strong position about the issue.