The Syrian Social Nationalist Party Page 2
9 For a detailed biography of Antoun Saadeh see Salim Mujais: Antoun Saadeh: a Biography, Kutub Publishing, Beirut, volume 1 (2004), volume 2 (2009), volume 3 (2018).
10 Dr. Khalil Saadeh (1857-1934) studied medicine at the Syrian Protestant College (currently American University of Beirut) and led a life of intense intellectual productivity and nationalist militancy. In addition to his medical writings, he was a novelist (in English his novels include Caesar and Cleopatra, and Anthony and Cleopatra; In Arabic: Secrets of the Russian Revolution, and Mystery of the Bastille, in addition to his translations of his own English novels), a linguist (his was the first major English-Arabic dictionary) and a political activist. The collected works of Dr. Khalil Saadeh in eight volumes have been recently edited by Badr el-Hage and Salim Mujais and published by Kutub, Beirut.
11 Letter from Antoun Saadeh to Hamid Frangieh. Antoun Saadeh: Complete Works, Saadeh Cultural Foundation, Beirut, 2001, volume 2, pp 9-12. All quotations from the writings of Antoun Saadeh are from this edition of his works in 12 volumes and translated from the Arabic by the present author.
12 Antoun Saadeh: The Emergence of Nations, Complete Works, volume 3, pp 1-159.
13 Ibid.
The Ideology of the SSNP
THE NATIONAL LANDSCAPE
The ideology of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) was formulated to redress the conditions responsible for Syria’s decadence and suffering, to define a desired future state, and to chart and execute the course toward that future state. The ailments of Syria were myriad: divisions along sectarian and ethnic lines, a corrupt political class, and an absence of a unifying national consciousness, all complicated by colonial intervention. When Saadeh returned to Syria in 1930 to found the SSNP, he encountered a country truncated by colonial interventions and burdened by the accretion of social ills of historic proportions. The Allied Conference at San Remo on April 24, 1920 had partitioned the former Ottoman territory into British and French mandates, in effect, formalizing the “secret” Sykes-Picot Agreements of 1916.1 The delineations of territory between British and French spheres of influence, as well as within their respective allocations, was the subject of compromise and constant change. The Franco-British Convention of December 23, 1920 defined the general boundary for Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq, but the agreed upon boundaries were arbitrary and subject to the interests of the negotiating parties. The most contentious demarcations were understandably those between the French and British areas of dominion.2 The story of the boundaries between the French and British areas is instructive as one contemplates the narratives that will later emerge in support of the artificial proto-states. Between Lebanon and Palestine, the British proposed a boundary from Sidon eastward to include the lower Litani valley. The French counter-proposals remained close to the Sykes-Picot boundary (which ran close to Safad). The final agreement placed the boundary a few miles north of the Sykes-Picot line. Hence, the demarcation between Lebanon and Palestine was not the natural outcome of a historical evolution of two distinct national identities, but rather subject to colonial whim that emerges as the major arbitror of the new artificial national identities. Similar considerations were operative in the delineation of the artificial boundaries between other neighboring states. This colonial behavior created artificial proto-states that challenge the development of a unified national consciousness and fractionate national efforts at liberation.
The imprint of colonial intent in the demarcation of the artificial states in the Near East is illustrated best by the case of the district of Mosul.3 On December 1, 1918, Lloyd George struck a deal with Clemenceau during the latter’s visit to London. Against a concession that Palestine would pass into British control and Mosul attached to Mesopotamia, Lloyd George promised his support for a French Mandate of Syria, which included not only the littoral, but also the hinterland. The agreement survived the subsequent squabbles during the Paris Peace Conference and served as a model for the arrangements at the San Remo conference.4 The allocation of the Mosul Vilayet in the San Remo agreements was a significant departure from the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement that had assigned the district to France. At San Remo, the interests of the two Powers in the oilfields of Iraq influenced the decisions of partition of lands. The British Government agreed to grant France a share in the crude oil or in development of the oilfields. Arrangements were made to transport oil from Iraq and Iran through the French sphere of influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. In consideration of this agreement, and the need to secure British support of French claims in the face of the rising independence movement in the Syrian areas occupied by the British, France officially conceded Mosul district for inclusion into Iraq.5
Sykes-Picot division of Syria
The separation of Syria between two spheres of influence under competing colonial powers had a profound effect on political and economic developments in the country. Both northern Syria under the French and southern Syria under the British would be subjected to administrative processes that undermine any effort at national unity or the emergence of effective unified resistance to foreign rule. As discussed below, in the north the French sought to create conditions favorable to their extended control of the region. In the south, the British had a similar aim with the added element of fulfilling their commitment to the creation of a Jewish national home. Both parties sought to undermine each other’s activities by giving refuge and sustenance to any movement capable of disrupting the plans of the competing party.
Two major phases can be discerned in the French mandate and the political and administrative organizations of the states under France’s tutelage prior to the founding of the SSNP. The first phase extends from General Gouraud’s arrival in Beirut on November 21, 1919 to the insurrection of 1925. The second phase, inaugurated by the appointment of Henry de Jouvenel as High Commissioner, ends with the defining of the Statut Organique in May of 1930.
In the first phase, two major developments took place: the territory under French mandate was “organized” into separate states, and each of these states was given a “representative” government. The French determined that as a policy Syria should be divided into segments with an indigenous façade behind which the French acted at will. This is explicitly stated by a diplomat at the Quai d’Orsay in May of 1920: “From now onwards it is necessary to consider the regime which will follow our occupation and that will allow us to maintain our position with reduced military resources… The need is for an indigenous façade which is reasonably consistent, behind which we can operate without direct responsibility and in the way and under the circumstances which we judge useful… The possibility of an Arab dynasty reigning over a united Syria being excluded, it would seem that there would be no danger in leaving the various ethnic groups, by themselves or with help requested from us, to establish the framework of their national autonomy… It will therefore be essential to make a study of those ethnic groups which may as soon as possible constitute the first regional autonomous units.” 6
The architect of this administrative reshaping of geographic Syria was General Henri Gouraud (1867-1946), an experienced colonialist and a battle hardened military commander. At the end of his stay in Syria, French prime Minister Poincare celebrated him as “Le pacificateur et l’organisateur de la Syrie!” From August 31, 1920 to December 20 of the same year, General Gouraud created and organized the separate states of Grand-Liban, Damascus, Aleppo, and the Alawites. The state of Jabal el-Druze was not constituted until October 24, 1922. To maintain stability, the French created “representative” governments, initially by appointment and subsequently by a combination of limited elections and appointments. While Gouraud was the executor of this policy of fragmentation, the colonial formulation was fiercely advanced by all levels of French government.
The insurrection of 1925 inaugurated the second phase, and while the aim of the insurrection was never to transform the political landscape, it did accelerate the transformation of political institutions. The French con
tinued to have challenges in securing cooperative local politicians in some parts of the country even after the brutal suppression of the insurrection of 1925. In the recently created states of the Grand Liban and the Alawites region, cooperation was relatively easy to secure. The new High Commissioner Henry de Jouvenel signed the Lebanese Constitution on May 23, 1926. He attempted to call for elections of a constitutional assembly in the Syrian State, but a general boycott of the elections put an end to this endeavor. It took 2 years until April 1928 before the High Commissioner Henri Ponsot called new elections.
The Assembly met first on June 9 and after two months of deliberations adopted a constitution to establish a parliamentary regime. However, the articles of the constitution were incompatible with the existence of the Mandate and the High Commissioner consequently dissolved the Assembly. After another lapse of two years, Henri Ponsot issued in May 1930 the organizational framework for all the states under French Mandate. To the 115 articles of the constitution prepared by the suspended Constitutional Assembly of the Syria State, he added Article 116 defining the role of the Mandatory authorities vis-à-vis local rule and safeguarding full French privileges!7 The so-called “Statut Organique” 8 enshrined the separate political and administrative organizations of the states of Lebanon, Syria (Damascus-Aleppo), Jabal el-Druze, Alawites, and the district of Alexandretta. While not allowing for any federal umbrella for these distinct political and administrative units, (a French commentator judged such an endeavor “premature!”) 9 the French nevertheless created a semblance of an economic unity by instituting the “Conférence des intérêts commun” with the aim of enhancing commerce and encouraging an economic revival. All of these permutations illustrate the perpetual determination of the French to maintain quasi-permanent control over the lands under Mandate.
In Palestine, the effects of collusion between the mandatory authority and the Zionist initiative were operative at various levels.10 The political, colonial and demographic aspects of this collusion have been amply documented.11 The demographic geography of southern Syria was being modified and the ability of the Southern Syrians (Palestinians) to resist this transformation was being systematically undermined. The British were keen to prevent the development of any para-state organizations that would allow the Palestinians to protect their very existence and the fabric of their communities.12 Unlike other parts of Syria (Lebanon, the hinterland, Jordan) where a semblance of a national state was established and Syrians participated to various degrees in their affairs and had a de facto apprenticeship in self-rule and state organization, the Syrians of Palestine were totally prevented from these pursuits. In contrast, Jewish para-state organizations were given free rein.
French colonial troops in Beirut, Lebanon 1930
The British resorted to partitioning of Southern Syria to suit their colonial need. Like other states in Geographic Syria, Trans-Jordan was an artificial creation. The ephemeral Syrian Kingdom of Faysal was inclusive of Trans-Jordan. With the defeat of Syrian forces in Maysaloun in July 1920, the region came under the control of the British. The British shied from direct rule and established several governing authorities (at least six) based on tribal-regional affiliations with British officers posted to each. These local governments were scrapped in favor of a unified region called Trans-Jordan under Emir Abdallah in March 1921. The borders of the region were established by agreements with the French who relinquished al-Ramtha to Trans-Jordan13 and with the triumphant Saudi government who had overthrown Abdallah’s father King Hussein of the Hejaz.14
When on March 27, 1921, the British recognized Emir Abdallah as provisional ruler of the district of Trans-Jordan, they did so to dissuade King Hussein’s impetuous son from executing his threat to take military action against the French in Syria. London feared that this attempt might provide an excuse for French forces to move into the British claimed zone. The draft of the Palestine Mandate was revised in August of 1921 to exclude Trans-Jordan from said mandate. Later, a distinction between Palestine and Trans-Jordan was made to limit the commitment of the British to the Jewish National Home. For the next decade, close supervisory control by the Mandate was exercised through a variety of means. The constant of the arrangement, however, was the alignment of Trans-Jordanian policy and activity with the aims of the Mandate to avoid any exacerbation of relations with the French. It is in this light that one needs to understand the efforts of Emir Abdallah to eliminate all anti-French activities originating in his region, in effect in the words of Churchill, Abdallah “has been asked to execute a complete volte-face and to take active steps to nullify the effects of his previous policy.”15
The British were not ready to allow Trans-Jordan to remain a hotbed of nationalist activity against the French. This meant a progressive “purge” of all elements from local government and armed forces that were anti-French and their replacement with regional representatives with allegiance to the Emir. Tribal chiefs as well as urban intellectuals argued, “Trans-Jordan was for the Trans-Jordanians,” creating a new separatist mentality under the firm control of an ambitious ruler.16 In this national landscape, the mere existence of Syria as a viable national entity was seriously jeopardized, hence the primordial importance of the definition of nationhood in the ideology of the SSNP.
THE NATION CONCEPT
The First Basic Principle of the SSNP states: “Syria is for the Syrians and the Syrians are a complete nation.” The first clause of the principle is an assertion of national sovereignty. The second clause is an affirmation of nationhood, and the two clauses together form a declaration of national identity. Since nationhood is a prerequisite and basis of national sovereignty, it would have been logical to assume that the order of the two clauses should have been reversed. It is likely, however, that Saadeh chose the order based on two considerations. The statement “Syria is for the Syrians” was very commonly used in the nationalist literature of the time and had become the rallying cry for national liberation efforts in the homeland and the diaspora.17 Incorporation of the statement as the first clause of the first basic principle would resonate in the minds of Syrians and elicit by its familiarity immediate recognition and acceptance. The second consideration is that the order of the two clauses recapitulates the ontogeny of Saadeh’s nationalist thinking. As he relates in his writings, the primordial element triggering his nationalist direction was pondering the causes of woe that befell Syria during and after the First World War. His initial conclusion was that the absence of national sovereignty was the originator of all calamities he and his compatriots experienced and continued to suffer. This identification of the absence of national sovereignty as the causal factor led him to study the question of nationhood and to the formulation of the principles of Syrian nationalism.18
Irrespective of the order of the two clauses, like all nationalist thinkers of all times, Saadeh recognized that nationhood provided the legal basis for sovereignty and was irrevocably linked to national identity. Hence, formulating a clear concept of the nation was a necessary and fundamental step for the construction of a national ideology. It is the formulation of the concept of the nation, its nature, and the elements leading to its emergence that separates Saadeh from the common linkage of nationhood and sovereignty in the writings of other nationalist theorists. Examining his nation concept is therefore essential prior to continuing the overview of the principles of Syrian nationalism.
Saadeh undertook to expound the findings of his study and contemplations of the question of nationhood in his seminal book Nushu’ al-Umam (The Emergence of Nations)19 written between 1935 and 1936, and published in Beirut in 1938. While he tackled the issue in other works, the systematic treatment that he offers in his book should take primacy in the elucidation of his ideas. In the introduction to the book, Saadeh defined the purpose of its writing: “National consciousness is the greatest social phenomenon of our time... For every group that rises to the level of national consciousness, the level of awareness of group personality, it becomes neces
sary for the individual members of that group to understand social reality, its conditions and the nature of the resultant relations. . .. A study of this nature that clarifies human social reality, its stages, conditions, and nature is necessary for every society that seeks survival. ... Any nation lacking scientific social studies will inevitably fall into ideological anarchy and intellectual confusion.” 20
An inquiry into the nature of a nation is necessary to safeguard the vitality of a national endeavor and avoid the pitfalls of division and conflict engendered by a confused understanding and definition of nationhood. It can have a profound effect on political theories and principles and consequently can influence the course of political events and actions.21 Saadeh was aware of the potential politicization of the concept of nationhood. “Every nation feels the need for sovereignty over itself and the protection of its interests from the transgressions of other nations. In this often violent conflict, the politicians and intellectuals of a nation resort to theories that agree with the conditions of their nations and can elicit a strong sense of solidarity and hope. Some will seek a historical precedent, a real or imagined example of history, or of a religious or ethnic argument.” 22 This politicization is operative internally as well as externally. “Conflicting theories are not confined to the conflict among nations, but can also affect approaches within a single nation to serve the interests and ambitions of different groups.” 23 He gives as an example the varying theories of French nationalism, but the example of Syria would be as apt. Muslims in Syria adopt Pan-Arabism as a front for Pan-Islamism and their theorists expound on Arab nationalism, whereas Christians in Syria invoke a Phoenician history as a front for Christian separatism. Theorists of nationalism are often influenced by their particular historical conditions that color their perspective. He cites Renan (1823-1892) as an example and the influence of the Capetian Dynasty on his definition of the nature of a Nation.24